Clearly, our presidential campaign system is broken – dysfunctional, busted, out of order. The fact that we might have 32 straight years of rule by Bushes and Clintons is just one symptom. The ascendance of Jimmy Carter, Bill Clinton, and George Bush are also symptoms – whatever their qualities or lack thereof, these are not people who built reputations within the political system or nation, that threw them into the ranks of world-class leaders, the way Roosevelt, Eisenhower, Johnson, Nixon, and probably even Reagan did. (Kennedy was famously a lightweight one-term Senator, but arguably won through a gradual & linear accumulation of popularity due to his extremely unusual popular appeal. Truman was somewhat random – the handpicked successor of a uniquely entrenched leader.)
I believe that several aspects of the problem can be captured through the lens of complexity theory.
One of the fundamental findings of complexity theory is that you get chaotic complexity and nonlinearity when thing are – how to say it? – circular, reflexive, turned in upon themselves, self-referential. This is true of the formulas behind the Mandelbrot Set and many other complex mathematical objects.
To take another example, one interesting area where complexity manifests itself is in so-called "networked industries," where positive feedback loops or "accelerating returns" kick in. In a linear market, people choose a product – cereal, say – based on what they like best. End of story. If more people like your cereal, you will sell more of it. It's a linear relationship. But in a networked market where your product connects with others, you can't just go by what you like – you must also ask yourself, "what does everyone else like?"
The most famous example of a networked market is the market for VCRs when Sony Betamax and
VHS were battling for dominance, but there are many more, including
computer operating systems, instant messaging programs, even languages
(English is winning). Networked economies are highly unstable in the early stages, and then they often snowball and settle on a winner that enjoys "lock-in" and can be impossible to dislodge. Importantly, the identity of that winner is highly unpredictable at the beginning, and not dependent on any kind of rational factors – the usual kinds of things such as better service, superior products, etc. – due to its chaotic 'sensitivity to initial conditions' (aka the Butterfly Effect). VHS won even though Betamax was better.
The reason such markets are unstable and unpredictable is that they are self-referential. Think about how circular it is: everyone wants to buy what everyone else is buying. Tiny, unpredictable factors early in a "standards war" can determine who the winner is.
That's just in case you thought Bill Gates was a billionaire just because he was smart or a good businessman. He may be smart or a good businessman, but that's not why he's a billionaire. DOS was never the best operating system on the market.
But this is all by way of background for my main point today: our presidential campaigns have become a self-referential cesspool of circularity and have thus become chaotically unstable in some unmeasurable but real mathematical sense.
What are the factors that give the system its circular and thus chaotic and thus seemingly random character?
First there is the money factor – that it takes so much to run. Much of that money is driven not by conviction, but like an investment. Companies in our corrupt system want to buy influence, and you don't get none if the guy you back doesn't win. Even earnest individuals do not want to "waste" money on someone who doesn't have a chance of winning. When campaigns center around money, they become governed by some of the characteristics and incentives of capitalism – in particular, as with any networked market, the money flows in the direction that things are already tipping, thus tipping things further. Think of trying to carry a full bathtub full of water on your back. For a while it sloshes around wildly, then it tips beyond recovery in a certain direction, and the water all flows there, making it tip further, which makes more water flow there, etc, and then it's irrecoverable. Same in the presidential race – first you have chaotic instability, then you have lock-in.
Second there is the media. In particular, two things about the media make it complex in a mathematical sense:
- Pack journalism. Because the media all know and watch and read each other and talk at parties, they tend to synch up their views. Plus, like any community, they collectively adopt certain conventions and parameters – that some candidates are not "real" for example. That means that the conventional wisdom is more likely to lurch in particular directions – and diversity within the media is less likely to serve as a counterweight.
- The horse race. As people have been complaining about for years, the media tends to focus on the horse race side of campaigns – who's ahead and who's not. This makes people keenly aware of who's on top and who's going down and amplifies the effect of the other factors I've discussed.
- Trivia and "perceptions." The media does not focus on broad policy positions, political context, and the constituencies at work – the things that are likely to determine how a president actually governs. As Paul Krugman put it a few years ago:
Somewhere along the line, TV news stopped reporting on candidates' policies, and turned instead to trivia that supposedly reveal their personalities. We hear about Mr. Kerry's haircuts, not his health care proposals. We hear about George Bush's brush-cutting, not his environmental policies.
The fact is, taken as a whole, the media in its coverage of presidential campaigns is a smarmy schoolyard bully, out to tease and mercilessly denigrate every candidate it can, fixating on every weakness it can find, or finding none, on random qualities which it then uses its power to define as weaknesses. (Funnily enough, this matches some descriptions of our president's personality I have read. But I don't know him personally.)
The media's justification for this focus on personality and perception – and this is the key point – is that such perceptions are what in fact determines a politician's success, and are therefore relevant and newsworthy. Hopefully the circularity of that statement leaps right out at you. As a matter of fact, it's circular in two ways. First, the media is saying that perceptions and personality are determinative, so they cover that, but the fact that they cover it is what makes it determinative. Second, it creates a situation where all the voters, even earnest policy-focused wonks – are constantly trying to gauge everyone else's perceptions in order to figure out who they will support.
Third, there is the candidates themselves. The candidates themselves – especially the Democrats – also intensify the feedback effects of the campaign dynamics. That is true in two ways:
- Desperation. The fact that Democratic voters want above all to win the White House – and this has especially been true in 2004 and 2008 – means that they want a candidate above all who will win. This means that many are voting based not on who they themselves like – as with breakfast cereal – but who they think everyone else will like, as with a networked product. I bet a decisive number of Iowa primary voters in 2004 didn't like John Kerry for who he was, but because they thought the rest of the nation would like him best, and he would therefore be best to beat Bush.
- Shaping. The fact that the media focuses so relentlessly on perception, combined with its schoolyard bully unpredictability, creates a field of candidates who are themselves focused intensely – even for politicians – on the perceptions of themselves held by others. They become highly, extremely self-conscious – not only personally, but institutionally, as they build entire staffs of imaging experts who are constantly peering into the house of mirrors for guidance on how the candidate should behave. That is inimical to candidates who are calm, steady, and consistent, and instead breeds candidates who are constantly monitoring and creating and recreating themselves, adding further to the instability of the whole situation.
The result of all these factors is a presidential selection process made up of highly unstable, self-referential dynamics that result in a process that swings wildly and nonlinearly between chaos and lock-in. Symptoms of this include the sudden, personality-based destruction of Howard Dean's campaign in 2004; the sudden emergence of John Kerry the same year, the making or breaking of the fortunes of some presidential candidates in 2007, long, long before any voters have cast any ballots for the 2008 race; the erratic 1992 race in which Bill Clinton teetered on the edge of destruction while Paul Tsongas and Ross Perot went up, went down. And as of this writing, it is starting to appear that Hilary Clinton is achieving lock-in already.
